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Legal ReformOther

Gary Lawson has been teaching securities law at Northwestern University
School of Law, where he is Assistant Professor. Walter Olson is Senior Fellow
at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and directs its Judicial Studies
Program.
The revolution in liability law started with personal-injury claims, and many
observers have imagined, or hoped, that it would remain confined to that
uniquely emotional class of cases. Not so. According to a survey by the
publication Inside Litigation, quoted in the May 18 Wall Street Journal, the
biggest judgments are now coming in the type of contract and business cases
where the complained-of injuries are financial. Among the professions sore
beset by lawsuits at the moment is one that puts out a wholly intangible
"product": accounting.
Damage claims now pending against accountants have been estimated at
between one and four billion dollars—a sum that could exceed the net capital of
all accounting firms put together. Add in future claims over the S & L debacle,
and the clouds grow darker still. Some of these suits are aimed at the
profession's shadier members and ethical edge-skaters and thus might not
worry the average practitioner. But most of the defendants are reputable
mainstream firms. The Big Eight have been hit hard, as have the nation's
30,000 small and medium-sized firms, and the sense is growing that
accounting, like obstetrics, neurosurgery and playground design, is becoming
the kind of field where no one is safe from being sued.
The litigation onslaught led directly to an insurance crisis: premiums went up
five-fold for the biggest firms from 1984 to 1987, and the number of insurers
writing malpractice coverage for smaller firms fell from twelve in 1980 to three
in 1986 before rebounding. In a survey of Wisconsin firms (cited as "recent" in
the September 1987 Journal of Accountancy), one-fifth reported that they no
longer had any coverage. Recently conditions have eased and coverage has
become more widely available, but it is anyone's guess how long this will last:
at some point the insurance cycle is bound to turn back from a buyer's to a
sellers market.
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Most often an accounting firm is sued when one of its clients goes broke. By
that point the linedup creditors at the bankruptcy court are like the customers at
a Soviet meat store; even for those at the front of the line, the pickings are slim.
Any individual officers who mismanaged or looted the company are likely to be
off the scene or assetless. What the creditors' attorneys look for is a solvent
defendant, and the one who increasingly fits the bill is the firm that certified the
company's financial statements—whether that firm was complicit in actual fraud
of some kind by the departed management, or merely (as is more common)
failed to detect the company's problems.
Leaving aside the S & L debacle for a moment, financial fiascos do not appear
to be much more prevalent today than at various times in the past. Yet (again,
even aside from S & Ls) the number of suits keeps rising. Unless auditors as a
group have become several orders of magnitude more careless or corrupt
lately, something must have happened on the legal scene. Actually, two
somethings have happened: the first is the erosion in key states of old
constraints on the right of third parties to sue accountants for negligence; the
second is the RICO law.
Accountants have never enjoyed any sort of across-the-board legal immunity.
They have always been open to suits from their clients if they fail to come up to
promised professional snuff. Federal and state securities laws have also given
outside investors certain rights to sue. But both these sources of liability are
relatively tightly drawn, holding auditors liable for negligence (as opposed to
fraud) only in fairly narrow circumstances. Until recently, the profession had
little trouble coping with the resulting exposure.
In 1931 New York's highest court declared in the landmark case of Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co. that third parties such as creditors and investors
who relied on financial statements could sue auditors for negligence only if the
third parties were (in effect) intended beneficiaries of the contract between the
firm and its auditor. To permit more, wrote then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo,
would be to create "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class." This strict rule was loosened somewhat over
the next half century, but only so far as to permit suds by third parties who the
accountants specifically knew would be receiving and relying on the certified
financial statements.
Then in 1983 came a thunderbolt: the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled (H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler) that a negligent auditor is liable to any reasonably
foreseeable person who properly obtains and relies on his or her work product
—which essentially means the entire universe of creditors and investors,
present and future, actual and potential. Several other states, including
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/caveat-auditor-rise-accountants-liability-5649.html
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Wisconsin and California, soon followed with even broader rules (the New
Jersey court left hope that accountants might limit their liability by restricting the
distribution of their work product; no such luck in Wisconsin or California). Thus,
auditors sued under those states' laws now face exactly the sort of incalculably
wide and unfathornably deep liability of which Judge Cardozo warned
in Ultramares.
The other development is the discovery by plaintiffs' lawyers of the private-suit
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970.
Under civil RICO, legitimate businesses increasingly find themselves accused
of "racketeering" in ordinary commercial disputes, and consequently face the
prospect of triple damages (plus attorney's fees). Playing the RICO game is
easy: any halfway competent lawyer can draft a complaint alleging the requisite
"pattern" of wire fraud, mail fraud, or securities fraud by an auditor. Whether
serious or patently silly, a RICO claim can have substantial settlement value
when filed against a company that relies heavily on its reputational capital.
(Drexel Burnham Lambert paid $650 million rather than face trial on federal
RICO charges, and accountants are believed to be more tender of their
reputations than investment bankers.)
If a suit shows even a remote prospect of a massive damage award, another
factor comes into play: since accounting firms are partnerships, the members
may each be jointly and severally liable for the full amount, and judgments can
come out of their personal assets (assuming insurance has run dry). All in all,
according to a Wall Street Journal report last year, RICO has become so
attractive in lawsuits against accountants that it is "often invoked in ‘frivolous'
claims because some attorneys believe that failing to invoke it could subject
them to malpractice charges."
The Regulation of Optimism
The courts that invite the new kinds of common-law suits, and the academics
who egg them on—along with the various advocates of wide RICO coverage—
all advance much the same arguments: whatever their role in an earlier day,
accountants are now public watchdogs and should be kicked regularly when
they fail to bark; the threat of triple/unbounded liability is needed to make them
properly careful; anyway, they can always spread the risk by buying malpractice
insurance.
It is no accident that these are much the same "enterprise liability" arguments
that have been deployed to justify the new productliability law. Dubious from the
start, they are especially shaky when extended to accountants. Start with costspreading. As Professors Victor Goldberg and Thomas Gossman have both
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demonstrated in recent articles (Victor Goldberg, "Accountable Accountants: Is
ThirdParty Liability Necessary?", Journal of Legal Studies, June 1988; Thomas
L. Gossman, "The Fallacy of Expanding Accountants' Liability", Columbia
Business Law Review, No. 1 (11988), p. 213), accountants are among the
worst conceivable candidates for the role of risk-spreader. Lenders and
investors can typically predict to the penny how much they will lose if they
guess wrong on an investment that goes sour. The more predictable the size of
the loss, the more easily it is hedged; even small investors can keep their eggs
spread among many baskets by investing in mutual funds or other diversified
assets. Accountants and their insurers, on the other hand, cannot predict the
extent of their open-ended exposure to an unknown, undefined and unlimited
plaintiff class; to make matters worse, accountants are thinly capitalized.
Draconian liability rules no doubt make accountants more careful in some way.
But in a good way? They penalize and thus discourage two distinct failings:
first, inaccuracy or incompleteness; and second, overoptimism (since erring in a
pessimistic direction will not lead to this sort of liability).
Accuracy and completeness, like all good things, come at a cost. The more
extensive an audit, the more expensive, and there is always room at the margin
to sample more of a given category of transactions, verify documents in a more
elaborate way, and so forth. Cad Liggio, general counsel of Arthur Young & Co.,
is quoted in the January 24 Wall Street Journal as saying that audits so intense
as to catch "all" fraud (in practice, a larger share of it) would cost perhaps four
to six times as much as today's audits, which can run several thousand dollars
apiece and are thus a major expense for small companies in particular.
Because auditors cannot know in advance which will be the problem areas or
clients, they will have to sell everyone the fuller audit. No advocate of stringent
auditor liability has attempted to show that the gains would be worth it.
Then there's the question of overoptimism. Many believe that accountants are
biased toward taking a sunny view of the financial condition of the companies
who pay their fees. The new legal scheme handles this putative bias by adding
an overlay of random terror that discourages all optimism, sincere or not. But
errors of conservatism are just as much a distortion of the market as errors of
recklessness. To the extent that auditors begin systematically understating
assets or profits, some creditors or investors will miss out on profitable
opportunities to do business because they believe the numbers. Others who
are less credulous will simply learn to ignore the constant cries of wolf, as many
investors already do with the gloomy boilerplate of SEC prospectuses.
Indeed, if it really made sense for accountants to intensify their efforts in a
major way, let alone serve as residual insurers against their clients' failure, it
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would have happened before now. Creditors and investors, which are
frequently huge institutions, could insist that corporate borrowers arrange for
more extensive audits or even, by offering vastly higher fees, induce their
auditors to provide third-party warranties against negligence. They do not,
which suggests that they realize it wouldn't be worth the cost on average.
Behind the new liability theories is an often-unexamined premise: that the real
task of the auditor is to serve not the client, who pays the fees, but the outside
public. This is not merely a way of stating the truism that auditors should be
independent of management; even on that traditional view, serving a client's
longterm interests can mean refusing to go along with the wishes of its current
management. The idea is instead that a separate and higher duty is owed to
the third parties who use auditors' work product gratuitously (and then complain
about it afterward when it is not all it might have been).
Where could people have gotten that notion? Well, it turns out that none other
than the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants carries on at length
in its ethical code about "the profession's responsibility to the public" and how it
"has grown as the number of investors has grown, as the relationship between
corporate managers and stockholders has become more important, and as
government increasingly relies on accounting information." These highminded
(though in fact debatable) sentiments come at a cost: they can be seen as a
standing invitation for third parties to come sue the AICPA's members. That is
exactly what has happened: courts and commentators have widely cited the
passage in their justifications of liability.
Many a discontented diner, after an unsatisfactory restaurant meal, has longed
for revenge on the idiot reviewer who puffed the offending establishment (make
him pay for the meal!). Yet most of us accept a world in which reviewers lay
only their credibility, and not their pocketbooks, on the line when they offer
opinions. Until recently the accountant, much like the food critic, could assume
that whatever his contractual obligations to those who paid for his work,
complete strangers would at least understand that they used his opinions at
their own risk. Now we hear less and less of voluntary agreement and more
and more of legal imposition. Given the track record of the modern liability
regime in the safety-related fields it has already conquered, the financial world
should brace itself. Caveat auditor.
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